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Summary findings
The basic economic challenge in the transition from  control over firms in advanced market economies and
socialism to capitalism is creating incentive structures  how such control interacts with that exerted  by equity
and institutions that promote enterprise change and  holders. They then ask whether creditors in Central and
restructuring. This is the motivation for most of the  Eastern European countries play similar roles and, if not,
reforms debated during the transition - whether  what roles they should play, and what can be done to
privatization, demonopolization,  trade reform, or  give them the capacity and incentives to play those roles.
financial sector reform. Most research on corporate  They focus on three fundamental requirements for debt
governance and privatization has focused on the role of  to function as a control  device: information, proper
owners - whether  on the problems inherent in the  incentives for creditors (including banks, suppliers, and
separation of ownership and management (most Western  government), and an efficient legal framework for debt
literature) or on the need for true owners who represents  collection (including collateral, workout,  and bankruptcy
the interests of capital (most literature on transition  regimes). While both countries are making progress in all
economies). But debt is also an important control  device,  three areas, there is still much to be done.
as Western literature on corporate finance increasingly  Hungary and Poland illustrate only two of many
recognizes.  approaches.  Other transitional economies, such as the
Baer and Gray explore debt's role as a control device  Czech Republic, Estonia, and Russia, are following
in transition economies, focusing especially on Hungary  different approaches that should be explored in future
and Poland, which are relatively far along in the reform  analysis.
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This paper - a joint product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Department and the Transition Economics
Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to explore issues  of corporate governance in
transition economies. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC
20433.  Please contact Grace Evans, room NI 1-041, extension 85783 (47 pages). June  1995.
The Policy Research  Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues.  An objective of the series  is to get the findings  out quickly, even if the presentations  are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should he used  and cited accordingly.  The  findings, interpretations, and conclusions  are the
authors' own and should not be attributed to the World Bank,  its Executive Board of Directors,  or any of its member countries.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterDEBT AS A CONTROL DEVICE IN
TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES:
The Experiences of Hungary and Poland
Herbert  L.  Baer* and  Cheryl  W.  Gray*
World  Bank
*  Formerly Financial Economist,  Policy Research Department.  Tragically, Herb Baer died
on February 27,  1995, from injuries sustained in a bicycle accident.
Principal Economist,  Policy Research Department.
Thanks are extended to Bernard Black, John Bonin, Gerard  Caprio, Constantijn
Claessens, Millard Long,  Roman Frydman,  Olivier Godron, Stephen Prowse,  Andrei
Rapaczynski, Roberto Rocha, and Itham Zurayk, who offered helpful comments on earlier
drafts.CONTENTS
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS  ................................  1
Debt as a Monitor in Market Economies  ...........................  1
Legal and Institutional Requirements for Effective Monitoring  ..............  3
The Need for Creditor Monitoring in Transitional Economies  ..............  5
CREDITOR CONTROL IN HUNGARY AND POLAND  ...................  6
The Problem of Information  ..................................  7
The Problem of Creditor Incentives  ..............................  11
Hungary's  Banking Reforms  ................................  14
Poland's Banking Reforms  ................................  15
Banking Performance ................................  16
The Legal Framework  for Debt Collection ...........................  22
Collateral  ...............................  22
Debt workouts  ...............................  24
Liquidation  ...............................  29
Is Debt Emerging as a Control Device?  . ..........................  32
Dealing with Nonperforming Borrowers  ..........  ..............  32
Restructuring  Unprofitable Firms  . ...........................  33
Liquidating Unviable Firms  ................................  34
Allocating New Credit  .................................  36
Changing Ownership  .................................  39
Prospects for the Future ..................................  40
BEYOND POLAND AND HUNGARY:  OTHER APPROACHES TO REFORM  ....  40iDEBT  AS A CONTROL  DEVICE  IN
TRANSITIONAL  ECONOMIES:
The Experiences of Hungary and Poland
Herbert L. Baer and Cheryl W.  Gray
The most fundamental economic challenge in the transition from  socialist to capitalism
is creating incentive structures and institutions that promote enterprise change and
restructuring.  This is the motivation for most of the reforms that are discussed in transition
debates, whether privatization, demonopolization, trade reform, or financial sector reform.
All of these reforms revolve around one central theme: imposing market-based constraints on
enterprise managers,  whether through competition or through direct corporate  governance.
Most research on corporate governance and privatization has focused on role of owners,
whether on the problems inherent in the separation of ownership and management (most
Western literature) or on the need for true owners who represent the interests of capital
(most literature on transition economies).  Yet debt is also an important control device, as is
increasingly recognized in Western corporate  finance literature.
This paper explores the role of debt as a control device in transition economies.  It
focuses in particular on two countries, Hungary and Poland,  that are among the countries
farthest along in the reform process.  The paper first asks in what ways creditors exert
control over  firms in advanced market economies, and how such control interacts with that
exerted by equity holders.  It then asks whether creditors in CEE countries play similar
roles, and,  if not, what roles they should play, and what can be done to give them the
capacity and incentives to play these roles.  Although this paper concentrates on Hungary and
Poland,  the legacy and the resulting shortcomings are similar in many transition economies.
Yet Hungary and Poland illustrate only two of many approaches.  As discussed in the
concluding section of this paper,  other transitional economies-such  as Russia, Estonia, and
the Czech Republic-provide  still different approaches that should be explored in future
comparative work.
A FRAMEWORK  FOR  ANALYSIS
Debt as a Monitor  in Market  Economies
Investments in capitalist firms can take two forms:  equity and debt.  From the
perspective of the investor, an important difference between these two is risk.  Equity
theoretically shares fully in both the successes and the failures of the firm, while debt2
receives a fixed return and thus shares much less if at all in the upside or the downside.'
These roles for equity and debt hold, however, only in situations with full information and
no agency costs;  i.e. where both owners and creditors know the actual financial condition of
the ftrm and where managers work fully in the interests of these financiers.  Corporate
governance-i.e.  monitoring and control-is  necessary to gain access to available informnation
and thereby make informned  investment decisions, and to motivate agents to act in the
interests of principals.  While holders of both equity and debt must monitor to protect their
financial investments, the goals,  incentives, and capacities that underlie such monitoring
differ.  Furthermore,  the tools at hand to effect monitoring vary,  as only equity involves
ownership, i.e.  the legal right to make management changes.  Debt is thus an important,
albeit different,  control instrument than equity.
As with equity holders,2 creditors can monitor either actively or passively. 3 The
active mode involves hands-on evaluation of a firm's  operations and investment decisions.
The passive mode depends on collateral for security, and to the extent there is analysis
behind a lending decision,  it is primarily of the value of the security interest rather than the
operations of the firm.  In practice, even fully secured lending generally involves some
degree of active monitoring on the part of the creditor in advanced market economies, given
the significant transaction costs involved in foreclosing on collateral.
Regardless of the form or intensity of oversight, debt plays a different-and  in some
ways complementary-monitoring  role to equity.  Corporate finance literature generally
views equity investors as less risk-averse, and thus control by equity holders as appropriate
for "normal"  (i.e. profitable) times,  in particular for times where entrepreneurial risk-taking
is needed.  Owners need to monitor to prevent managerial largess, asset-stripping, or misuse
or wastage of retained earnings or free cash flow.  Monitoring by equity holders has its
inherent weakness, however:  it may lead to overly-risky investments at the expense of debt
holders, to the extent equity can appropriate all upside gain but shares in any downside loss.
'  Teb main  risk  to debt  in stable  market economies--the risk  of default  (to  the extent  uncompensated by
collateral)--can to some extent  be compensated through higher interest margins, which can thus translate into some
limited sharing  of both downside  and  upside risks.  A second risk  to debt,  particularly  in less stable transition
economies,  is unanticipated inflation.  In environments with high and/or erratic inflation, equity may actually be
less risky than debt.
2  Much of the Western corporate govemance literature has contrasted U.S. and German or U.S. and Japanese
modes of governance  by equity holders.  The U.S. system is a model of  passive governance,  involving primarily
entry and exit of investors and disciplining prirnarily through the indicator of  stock price.  Germnan  and Japanese
systems, on the other hand, are more nearly models of active governance or "relational" investing, with monitoring
via membership on boards, shareholder voting, and other hands-on means.  In the U.S., however, the passive mode
can revert to active govemance through corporate takeovers, as the purchase of blocks of shares gives new owners
the power to change firm  policy and management.  The mere threat of takeover acts as a powerful control device
in many cases.
3  Holmstr6m (1992) and  Holmstr6m and Tirole (1993), as cited in Berglof (1994).3
On the other hand, owners are unlikely to prematurely liquidate firms with long-term
potential viability.
In contrast to owners,  creditors are expected to be more risk-averse,  because they do
not share in upside gains.  For this reason,  creditor monitoring is generally considered to be
more appropriate when tight controls on spending and investment are needed, particularly  in
times of financial distress. 4 Indeed. foreclosure and bankruptcy laws tend to shift control to
creditors in such times.  However,  because of the tendency to risk aversion and short-
sightedness on the part of creditors,  creditor control carries the danger of premature
liquidation of potentially viable debtor finns  (the mirror image of the danger of overly-risky
investments under owner control).
Within categories of debt, short-term creditors have more control levers at their
disposal, and thus tend to exert the strongest control.  First,  short term credit is by definition
refinanced more often, providing more opportunities for creditors to review investment
decisions, adjust interest rates to account for risk, or refuse to roll over or grant additional
loans altogether.  Second, short-term credit is often secured (if at all) by short-term assets
(such as inventories or accounts receivable).  Foreclosure on these assets is relatively easy,
and thus a creditor can easily impose a credible tlhreat  of foreclosure  (perhaps leading to
liquidation of the borrower)  if the debt is not repaid.  Long-term credit is less flexible, both
because of the typically thinner market for long-term assets and because of the creditor's  less
frequent involvement in roll-over decisions, and thus long-term creditors tend to be weaker,
less credible monitors.  This partly explains why short-term and long-term credits are often
held by different parties,  the former by the better and more aggressive monitor. 5
Even within the category of short-term (or long-term) debt, the monitoring challenge
is greater for new credit than for rollovers of existing credit.  New credit puts an additional
debt-service burden on the debtor firm and is therefore riskier than a rollover.  Yet as a
source of financing new credit  has certain advantages to new equity from a control
perspective,  because it can encourage optimal effort from managers to the extent they are
also owners or otherwise share in upside gains throughi profit-sharing compensation.
Legal and Institutional Requirements for Effective Monitoring
Equity and debt monitoring use different mechanisms and are therefore appropriate in
different institutional settings.  The requirements for good corporate governance by equity
holders have been extensively analyzed.  Passive monitoring primarily through entry and exit
Aghion  and  Boiton  (1992)  and  Hoshi,  Kashyap,  and  Sharfstein  (1990).  Financial  distress  can  result  from
intentional  actions  of  agents  as  well  as  from  impersonal  market  forces.  Just  as  owners  must  monitor  to  prevent
asset-stripping  by  managers,  so debtors  must  also  monitor  to prevent  asset-stripping  by  owners.
5  Bergl6f  and  von  Thadden  (1994).4
(as is typical in the U.S.,  for example) cannot take p!ace unless equity markets are
sufficiently deep and unless law and supporting institutions require extensive disclosure to
shareholders and provide adequate protection for the interests of minority shareholders.
Active monitoring by owners (as in Germany and Japan) depends less on the equity market
and underlying institutions, but it still requires supportive corporate  laws and adequate
disclosure.
The legal and institutional requirements for effective debt monitoring have not been as
thoroughly analyzed but are no less important.  Passive monitoring by creditors (via
collateral contracts) requires, above all, efficient property markets.  Such markets in turn
require clear  legal definition and enforcement of property rights (both existing and
contingent), low-cost information (generally via property and collateral registries),  and
property markets of sufficient size and depth.  Active monitoring by creditors  relies less on
underlying property markets,  but it does require sufficient flexibility in debt contracts to
allow such monitoring,  adequate availability of information via reliable accounting and
sufficient disclosure requirements, and workable frameworks for reorganization  and
liquidation.
Because of these institutional requirements,  the degree of active (as opposed to
passive) monitoring by owners and creditors may well to be correlated in particular  settings.
Economies with hands-on owners are more likely to have hands-on creditors,  and vice versa.
More active monitoring-whether  by debt or equity-grows  out of other characteristics of the
financial and legal systems in a country and in turn reinforces them.  For example, active
monitoring  is generally correlated with stronger banks but weaker capital markets and less
onerous public disclosure rules for firms.6
Whether debt or equity, the effectiveness of monitoring also depends on the capacities
and incentives of the monitors.  In the case of equity the capacities and incentives of
institutional investors (such as pension funds, mutual funds, or universal banks) are likely to
be critical.  In the case of debt one must consider the incentives and capacities of bank,
trade,  and government creditors,  as well as other individuals or institutions that may hold
publicly traded debt.
In sum, debt and equity play somewhat different, complementary roles.  The
appropriate balance between debt and equity (i.e. the firm's  capital structure) depends.
among other factors, on the balance between these various monitoring needs and institutional
characteristics.7 Greater debt might be warranted if (a) the legal framework for debt
6  For one  attempt to  formulate various  characteristics  of  "bank-oriented" vs.  "market-oriented"  ftnancial
systems,  see Berglof (1994).
'  There are of course many factors other than monitoring needs that also influence the capital structure of firms.
For a summary of the literature see Harfis and Raviv (1991) and Myers (1989), and for developing countries, Glen
and Pinto (1994).5
collection is strong;  (b) the returns to additional managerial effort are high; (c) the  is
relatively little downside risk (and therefore interests margins can be modest); (d) there is
large risk of misuse of free cash flow by managers (because of agency problems due to the
separation of ownership and management); and/or  (e) the control powers of equity are weak
because of dispersed shareholding, poorly defined shareholder rights, or owners without
monitoring competence.  In contrast, greater reliance on retained earnings and closely-held
equity stakes may be warranted if the legal framework for debt collection (i.e.  collateral,
foreclosure,  and bankruptcy laws and procedures) or monitoring competence of creditors  is
weak,  or if there  is large downside risk and thus investors with lower risk aversion are
desirable.8
The Need for Creditor Monitoring in Transitional Economies
The framework presented above points out the magnitude of the challenge of
developing effective corporate governance in the transition economies of Central and Eastern
Europe.  Several preliminary  "lessons" stand out with regard to the need for monitoring by
owners and creditors.  First,  given the high degree of economic uncertainty (including
inflation in many instances) and the "noisiness" of the environment, financing through
retained earnings and tightly-held' equity investments is likely to be particularly
important," 0 and ratios of debt to total assets can be expected to be low under market
forces.  Debt finance fits uncomfortably in such an environment, and creditors are likely to
s These conclusions  regarding  capital structure  and monitoring  needs are drawn largely  from theoretical  work
in corporate finance in recent years.  In addition to this theoretical work, there is a small but growing body of
empirical  work on the role of debt as a control instrument,  and on the practice of bankruptcy  andlor financial
reorganization  in advanced  market  economies. This  work, focussed  mostly  on U.S. experience,  attempts  to analyze
the impact of large increases in leverage on firm performance, the costs of various reorganization  routes, the
conditions  under  which reorganization  can or cannot successfully  occur, and the effects  of bankruptcy  on the debtor
firm. For example,  with regard to reorganization  routes, Gilson,  John and Lang  (1990)  found  that  in the U.S. firms
with only a few  debtors, and no publicly-held  debt, have  an easier time restructuring  out of bankruptcy.  Another
study by  Gilson (1989) found that both bankruptcy and out-of-court  debt workouts led to large changes in
management  and ownership in the affected firms.  Hotchkiss (1992) studied 197 companies  that successfully
completed  a Chapter 11 procedure  and found  significant  evidence  that the process  was biased  toward  a continuation
of firms that should  be liquidated. All in  all, while  creditors  clearly  have the capacity  and incentives  to assert  strong
control over firms in financial  distress in the U.S., the literature  on U.S. bankruptcy  indicates  that this control is
somewhat  weakened  due  to the pro-debtor  provisions  embodied  in the Chapter 11  bankruptcy  reorganization  process.
In addition  to the literature  on the U.S., there  is also a significant  body of literature  on the control  roles of Japanese
main banks and German universal banks (for example, see Sheard (1994), Aoki (1994), and Baums  (1994)).  It
generally  supports  and underscores  the more  theoretical  treatment  summarized  above. However, there is virtually
no in-depth  analytical  empirical  work that assesses  the influence  that creditors  have  over debtors through  infornal
debt workout  or bankruptcy  processes  in those countries.
9 Equity  needs to be tightly-held  to avoid the agency  problems  inherent  in dispersed  shareholding,  particularly
if monitoring  by debt holders is weak.
'°  McKinnon (1991).6
demand large premiums to compensate for the large downside risks inherent in transition, the
difficulties of monitoring.  and the high costs of debt collection (as discussed later).
Furthermore,  because the mere existence of debt can make equity holders more willing to
take risks, rational creditors will be more hesitant to lend to highly leveraged firms.'"
Second, even if equity (including retained earnings) serves as the largest source of
financing,'2 the complementary control and monitoring roles played by creditors are still
needed, particularly  given the urgent need for change and restructuring in many firms.  For
potentially good firms,  debt finance can provide incentives for greater effort from owners
and managers, allowing them to reap most upside gains.  For nonviable firms,  creditor
monitoring (including refusal of credit when appropriate) is needed to prevent further
wastage of resources and to  spur exit.  For firms with an uncertain future, creditor
monitoring is needed to put a brake on overly-risky behavior.  In all cases, creditor
monitoring is important to the extent equity monitoring remains weak, because the state is
the owner, because new owners (especially insiders) are unwilling to cede control to outside
equity investors,  or because capital markets and/or shareholder rights and disclosure rules are
underdeveloped.
Third, creditors  should always monitor their investments for their own sake.  Owners
and managers can strip assets at the expense of creditors, just as managers can do so at the
expense of owners.  The principal-agent problems inherent in the separation of ownership
and management are no less relevant to the conflicts of interest between a firm and its
creditors.
CREDITOR  CONTROL  IN HUNGARY  AND POLAND
While many economic policies can be changed overnight,  it takes time to develop the
complex institutions needed for a market economy to function properly.  This is nowhere
more true than in the financial system, which in market economies operates through a web of
complex interlinked rules and institutions.  The economies of Central and Eastern Europe are
now completing their first half-decade of full-fledged transition,  although Hungary and
Poland began the process to some extent in the 1980s.  The rules and institutions that would
be needed for debt to play a strong and independent monitoring  role did not exist in the
socialist period and therefore  must be created virtually from scratch.  After a brief look at
"  This "lesson"  has an  important corollary:  Transitional  economies that develop the  proper incentives and
institutions to support equity financing and monitoring by owners are likely to prosper compared to those that do
not.  Privatization policies play a significant role here.
12  Retained earnings are  the largest source of  financing even in advanced market economies, but debt levels
are still higher than in transition economies (Mayer,  1990).7
the structure of enterprise  debt, the rest of this section discusses this difficult process of
institutional change.
Selected financial data for enterprises in Hungary and Poland for  1992 are shown
in Table 1.  Three characteristics stand out.  First,  Polish and Hungarian enterprises, while
carrying a significant amount of debt, still tend to have rather moderate ratios of debt to total
assets and low ratios of bank debt to total assets." 3 Because 1992 was still an early year in
the transition process,  much of the debt on enterprise books at that time was carried over
from socialism (or was a rollover of debt incurred during socialism) and thus reflected non-
market financing processes.  However,  new flows of voluntary debt finance have been scarce
since that time.  Macroeconomic constraints in both countries have led to major credit
tightening, and the total real value of outstanding bank credit to enterprises has declined
since 1991 in both countries (Figure  1).
Second, debt carried on the books of enterprises  is not owed exclusively or even
primarily to banks.  Trade partners and government (i.e. tax, customs, and social insurance
agencies) are also significant creditors,  albeit often involuntarily.  A major category of debt
in advanced market economies that has not yet developed on a large scale in the transitional
economies is the corporate  bond market.
Finally, enterprise debt-even  that owed to banks-is  overwhelmingly short-term,
with maturity periods of less than one year.  While to some extent this is also an "accident"
of history,  it may well persist under market forces because of the need of lenders in this
environrment  to monitor their borrowers through regular review as loans are rolled over.
In sum, enterprises carry substantial amounts of primarily short-term debt to various
types of creditors on their books.  Does this debt play a significant role as a market-based
constraint on managerial behavior?  There are three crucial underpinnings to creditor
monitoring and control in market economies.  These are (1) adequate informnation,  (2)
market-oriented creditor  incentives, and (3) an appropriate legal framework.  To what extent
are they now developing,  and what lessons can be learned from progress to date?
The Problem of Information
If debt is to serve as an instrument to influence firm behavior,  the first critical
requirement is information.  While this fact may seem obvious, the constraints imposed by
the lack of information in transitional economies must not be underestimated.  Viable lending
requires that the lender have access to information on the borrower and the capacity to act oii
that informnation. Likewise, viable intermediation requires that depositors and/or bank
'3  These  averages,  of course,  mask differences  among  individual  firms.  It is interesting  to note that  bank  debt
appears  to be quite concentrated  in a relatively  small  number  of firms  in Poland, whereas it is more  evenly spaced
among  a larger  number  of firms in Hungary.  Gomulka  (1992), Bonin  and  Schaffer  (1994).TABLE 1:  Debt Burdens  of Hungarian  and Polish Firms. 1992
HUNGARY  POLAND  OECD
57,000  603 firms  approx.  (range)
firms  (lossmakers)  200 firms
Total Debt/Total Assets  .34  .43  .41  .43 - .67
Percentage  of Total Debt Owed  to:
Banks  .45  .24
Government  .27  .16
Suppliers  .21  .36
Other"  .07  .24
1.00  1.00
Percentage  of Total Debt That Is:
Short-term  (<  I year)  82%  80%  86%  50%-84%
Long-term  18%  20%  i4%  16%-50%
Source: The Polish data is from a survey of approximately  200 firms conducted  by a tearn led by Dr. Marek
Belka  and financed  by a World Bank research project on Enterprise Reform in Eastern Europe. The
Hungarian  data is from a survey of tax returns carried out by the Hungarian  Ministry of Finance. The
OECD data is from Rajan and Zingales (1993).
'  From other data gathered in the Polish survey, it appears  that most of the debts included in "other" in
Poland should be allocated  to the three earlier categories,  primarily  "suppliers".
'  Total debt includes  short-term  payables  to suppliers and government  as well as long-term  bank debt.'661  Z66L  L661  £661  Z66L  L66;
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supervisors have access to information on ban!k  portfolios.  In Hungary and Poland, as in
other transitional economies,  information asymmetries-in  both firms and banks-are
frequently severe.
In the case of enterprises,  financial and cost accounting systems were poorly
developed prior to transition.  As a result, asset values are not well inventoried, and changes
in asset holdings may be poorly  documented in many firms.  In those instances where
accurate information systems did exist prior to transition,  dramatic changes in the structure of
input prices, demand, competition, and distribution channels have reduced the value of this
prior  information.  High tax rates and weak tax enforcement have created strong incentives
in both Hungary and Poland for profitable enterprises to mask their performance,  further
reducing the value of information.  Reputation, the basis for much lending in advanced
market economies,  is of limited value in transitional settings.  Private entrepreneurs must
build a reputation for integrity from scratch, while the managers of state-owned enterprise
with a reputation for integrity may see this reputation devalued.  In short, from an
information viewpoint, every post-transition firm to some extent is a new firm, even if it has
been operating for 50 years.
In addition to shortfalls in accounting systems and the information "chaos" that results
from rapid changes in the external environment, information problems are exacerbated in
transitional economies by institutional weakness.  This is true, first of all, within banks
themselves.  Many bank employees are not trained in techniques of market analysis and loan
appraisal,  and thus have difficulty in analyzing and using the information that is available
from potential borrowers.  This is also true for the financial sector more generally.  Even
when lending between bank and borrower is viable in theory,  for example, the cost and
viability of bank intermediation may be threatened by insufficient outside controls on bank
management.  Monitoring by bank supervisors and/or depositors is needed to counteract
fraud,  moral hazard. and x-inefficiency among bank owners and employees-  public or
private. 4 Bank supervisors may lack not only the technical ability but also the political will
to carry out tough supervision." 5 Furthermore, the "watchdog" professions,  including
accounting, law,  securities,  and credit rating services, are still in their infancy, making it
difficult for outside investors to monitor firms or intermediaries or to take any recourse to
prevent fraud or misuse of their investment.
1  The problems of the Savings and  Loan Industry in the U.S. vividly illustrate the sorts of problems that can
arise under private as well as public ownership,  if supervision is weak and deposit insurance insulates depositors
from  the incentive to monitor the  banks entrusted with their  money.  Problems also plague the private banking
sectors of many transitional economies.  One expert has suggested that 90 percent of the private banks in Poland
are corrupt and/or  insolvent and should be shut down.  Many of Russia's  private banks are in a similar situation.
'5  Some transition countries have had more aggressive banking supervision that others.  Most notable is Estonia,
which has forced depositors  of  insolvent institutions to bear  losses.  Hungary's  banking supervision is generally
thought to have been particularly weak during the transition process.11
When information asymmetries are significant, adverse selecti^n may make it costly if
not impossible for outsiders to fund the growth of a firm with either debt or equity.'6
Enterprises will be forced to rely almost exclusively on retained earnings and injections of
capital by insiders." 7 The most profitable enterprises will grow the most rapidly.  If lending
occurs,  it will typically be based on collateral rather than cash flow.  Indeed, these patterns
to a large extent describe the transition economies today.
The Problem  of Creditor  Incentives
The second essential requirement for debt to serve a control function is an appropriate
market-based incentive framework for creditors.  Before turning to banks,  let us look briefly
at the incentives of the other creditors  listed in Table 1.  In Hungary and Poland the principal
creditors aside from banks are government  and trade creditors.  The government creditors
include the tax office, the social security service, and the customs office.  Debt to these
agencies became a substantial portion of the debt on the books of problem firms in Hungary
and Poland in the early  1990s.  While some of this debt simply reflects payment lags built
into law, much of it reflects overdue arrears.  These authorities were not known for active
law enforcement and collection of arrears;  in contrast, their legacy was one of pervasive
bargaining and redistribution from profitable and loss-making firms." 8 These habits are not
easy to change overnight, although there  is some evidence (in part from the authors'
discussions with bankruptcy trustees and liquidators) that budget pressures have made
government creditors more vigilant in both countries.  However,  tax and social security
arrears clearly are a major source of financing for firms in financial distress.'9 With regard
to voluntary credit,  governments are poorly positioned to either evaluate and monitor firms
or extend large amounts of credit to them.  The latter is especially true in Poland and
Hungary,  where both governments have been under severe budgetary pressures.
As with government debt, a significant portion (although clearly not all) of the debt to
trade creditors consists of overdue receivables.  Many of these receivables arose in 1991 and
1992, when the enterprise sector in both countries was subject to serious demand and
liquidity shocks.  These shocks resulted in a stock of inter-enterprise credits that itself
undercut discipline due to the fear of "domino" bankruptcies if any one party attempted to
collect debts.  As with government credit,  however, there is evidence that trade creditors are
6  See Diamond (1991),  for example.
7  See Myers and Majluf (1984).
18  Kornai and Matits (1984), Vodopivec (1994), Schaeffer (1990).
'9  Belka, Schaffer,  Estrin,  and Singh (1994),  Bonin and Schaffer (1994).12
slowly hecoming more active in preventing the emergence of new overdue receivables by
requiring payment in advance before goods are shipped to problem finrms.20
The rest of this discussion on creditor  incentives focuses on bank creditors.  As noted
earlier,  credit from banks represents less than half the total liabilities of troubled firms in
both Poland and Hungary.  Yet banks arguably play the pivotal role among creditors in
maintaining borrower discipline.  Apart from seLf-financing  and temporary involuntary
financing from government, trading partners,  and employees through arrears,  banks are the
only source of financing available now to most Hungarian and Polish firms.
By 1992 many of the state-owned commercial banks in Hungary and Poland were
probably insolvent when evaluated using internationally accepted accounting principles.
These insolvencies were the result of several factors, including bad loans inherited from the
socialist "monobank",  transition-induced defaults on existing loans, and defaults on new
credits extended after the onset of relative price reform.  While part of the problem  was
"inherited"  from the breakup of socialism,  much of it arose from post-socialist lending,
particularly  lending during the 1990-1991 period.2'  Not only was this period particularly
difficult economically, with the breakup of the CMEA trading regime and deep domestic
recessions in both countries, but the initial post-socialist incentive structure did not encourage
banks to expend time or resources cleaning up loan problems and exercising control over
their borrowers.  While many state-owned enterprises found themselves subject to hard
budget constraints, the same could not be said of the state-owned commercial banks.
Government decisions to guarantee the deposits of state-owned banks (explicitly or implicitly)
in effect exempted the troubled banks from depositor discipLine. In practice,  state-owned
banks in both countries were also exempted from international risk-based capital
requirements. 22 Further confusing the situation was the perception that both economies
were  "underbanked".  There were too few branches, too few skilled lenders, and too few
resources devoted to providing payments services.  While unprofitable enterprises  in the
manufacturing sector were laying off employees and cutting back production, unprofitable
banks were hiring employees and expanding.
Hungary and Poland both responded to the problems in the banking system by moving
to reinvigorate existing banks via recapitalization.  On the one hand, a one-time
recapitalization early in the transition process is arguably necessary (but not sufficient) to
establish viable institutions, given the undercapitalized state of most commercial banks when
2  BeLka,  Schaffer,  Estrin,  and  Singh  (1994).
Abel (1994) provides supportive  data for Budapest  Bank.
'- In  Poland,  published  financial  numbers  were  in violation  of the  international  risk-based  capital  guidelines  until
the March 1993 recapitalization. In Hungary, accounting rules prior to December 1991 did not require banks  to
recognize and provision against their bad loans.  Even subsequent to the adoption of  the new banking law and
implementing  regulations  in late 1991 and early 1992, anecdotal  evidence  suggests that  banks  often continued  to roll
over loans to large state-owned firms rather than recognize them as problems.13
initially separated from the monobank. Undercapitalized  banks cannot  operate for long
without government  support and may face perverse incentives  to continue  distress lending
and engage in ever riskier behavior in order to avoid bankruptcy. On the other hand,
growing experience from around the world is showing that recapitalization  is itself a risky
undertaking,  particularly if undertaken  repeatedly. In the absence of other changes in
policies and bank management,  recapitalization  of insolvent banks may actually make matters
worse by skewing incentives  even further away from efficient bank restructuring. Bank
managers may begin to believe that future losses will also be offset by the government. This
will encourage  fraud and moral hazard and further undercut the incentives  of banks to expend
time and energy pursuing delinquent  borrowers.
The concurrent adoption  of other policies may at least partially offset the adverse
consequences  of recapitalization  by strengthening  the market-based  incentives  facing
managers.  For instance, when bank recapitalization  is conducted  in preparation for
privatization,  competent bank managers  may exert additional  effort in order to enhance  their
post-privatization  employment  prospects. Alternatively, it might be possible to develop
incentive systems that motivate  managers  even in banks that continue  to be state-owned. The
importance  of implicit and explicit incentives  cannot be overemphasized. Managers' efforts
to maintain  their reputations  might be sufficient  to head off outright fraud.  However, if laws
and norms on fiduciary responsibility  are weak and information  on banks' financial  status is
scant, as it is in all transitional  economies, reputation  alone may not be enough to lead
managers to develop appropriate credit policies, to force tumarounds in delinquent
borrowers, or to resist political  pressure to extend new credits to ailing state-owned
enterprises and politically connected  new borrowers.  Theoretically,  one could design
incentive systems to press managers toward fundanental reform. 23 However, the state as
owner would have to set up, monitor, and enforce such systems, and most state agencies
themselves suffer from similar incentive  problems.
While recapitalization  is not the only option open to transitional  economies  (as
discussed  further in the last section  of the paper), it was the option chosen by Hungary and
Poland.  Experience  to date in these two countries illustrates  the importance  of carefully
chosen incentives and appropriate accompanying  policies in mitigating  the moral hazard
inherent in such recapitalization.
`  There  are two general  approaches to the incentive problems  inherent in this situation.  The first would be
to mandate the desired behavior (as opposed to outcomes) through directives or management contracts.  Managers
that failed to meet their goals would be fired.  Managers that met or exceeded their goals would be rewarded.  The
second approach would be to give managers a claim whose value was tied to the performance of the bank.  Possible
forms  include  contracts  where  the government  rewards performance  (for  instance,  performance-based pay)  and
instruments where performance  is rewarded by the market (for instance, warrants  to purchase shares of the bank
at privatization).  Properiy  constructed,  these claims would give  managers  incentives to identify and  undertake
actions to increase the bank's  value.  The two approaches are not mutually exclusive.  Management mandates may
be necessary to preclude strategies that are clearly against the best interests of the bank (as opposed to its managers),
while performance based claims may be necessary to encourage mangers to choose the most effective of a number
of possible courses of action.14
Hungary's  Banking Reforms
Hungary's  experience with bank reform until mid-1994 showed relatively little
attention to the dangers  of potentially negative incentives arising from recapitalization.
Hungarian banks were effectively recapitalized four times during that period-in  1991, 1992,
1993, and  1994.  In the first of these programs,  in 1991, the government issued guarantees
for HUF 21 billion (about US$280 million) of doubtful loans, equal to one-half of the
doubtful loans that had been transferred  to the commercial banks when they were created out
of the previous  mono-bank in 1987.  In the second program, the  1992 Loan Consolidation
Scheme, the government purchased HUF  120 billion of the state-owned commercial banks'
problem loans for approximately HUF 98 billion (about US$1.2  billion) in state bonds.'
Of the HUF  120 billion in debt, HUF 41 billion was transferred  to a new institution, the
Hungarian Investment and Development Rt.  (HID),  while the remainder stayed with the
banks, who were to act as collection agents for the Finance Ministry.  HID was envisioned
as a collection/workout agency with a mandate to restructure  debtor enterprises where
possible.
In the third instance,  in late  1993, the government  implemented a Bank
Recapitalization and Loan Consolidation  Program, pursuant  to which it issued state bonds
worth HUF  171 billion (almost US$2 billion) to eight problem  banks.  Of this, HUP  114
billion was a direct capital infusion, ostensibly to bring banks'  capital asset ratios up to 0%,
and HUF  57 billion involved government purchases from the banks of the loans of 16 large
ailing Hungarian enterprises  (plus a large number of smaller agricultural cooperatives) that
had been explicitly targeted for rescue.  Subsequently, in May  1994, another HUF  16 billion
(about US$170 million) was injected into 5 of the 8 banks to raise their CARs to a purported
4%.  Finally,  the government plans to inject another HUF 20 billion or so into these banks
in December  1994 to bring their CARs to 8 percent.
Thus,  over 4 years  some US$3.4 billion-equivalent  to about 9% of  1993 GDP-was
injected into Hungarian  state banks (and this number is likely to increase still further in the
near future).  Yet little else was done to create strong and appropriate incentives for bank
restructuring.  No independent, in-depth portfolio or operations reviews were completed by
the government prior  to the recapitalizations.  Performance-oriented management contracts
were not implemented, nor were bank managers given strong and clear incentives to
undertake actions that would increase the value of the banks they managed. 25 The
4 The numerical figures on the 1992,  1993 and 1994 programs are taken from World Bank data and/or Bonin
and Schaffer (1994).
7  The 1993 recapitalization was ostensibly designed to create incentives for bank-led enterprise restructuring,
because it required the banks to enter into workout procedures with certain problem debtors.  However, as discussed
later in the paper, the govemrnent buy-out option included in the plan led some banks to consider the govermnent-
rather than the problem debtor--as the main negotiating partner.  Although the conciliation process is still ongoing,15
goveurnent  did not formulate a clear plan for state-bank privatization, although two banks
(the foreign trade bank and Budapest Bank) have recently undertaken privatization programs
largely on their own initiative. 26 Most observers agree that banking supervision has been
weak.
Poland's Banking Reforms
The Government of Poland,  after a rocky start, appears to have made more significant
efforts than Hungary  in the four years to mid-1994 to deal with the perverse incentives faced
by the managers of a group of state-owned banks.  Like Hungary,  it opted to recapitalize its
commercial state banks, but unlike Hungary,  it carried out only one recapitalization (of PLZ
11 trillion, or US$650 million).  Furthermore,  this recapitalization was embedded in a much
larger program designed to change incentives and promote privatization in commercial banks.
The program was made credible by the strong and consistent leadership of the Polish
Ministry of Finance from  1990 through  early  1994.
Changes in incentives began in  1992 and culminated in the adoption of the Enterprise
and Bank Restructuring  Program  ("EBRP")  in February  1993.  The government  sought to
affect management behavior both directly and indirectly-directly  by mandating certain
actions and indirectly by creating incentives to maximize the value of the banks.  Direct
controls began in the spring of  1992, when the Ministry of Finance actively discouraged
banks from making loans to problems debtors.  An outright prohibition on such lending was
enacted into law with the passage  of the EBRP.  The policy of prohibiting  new lending to
nonperforming borrowers  had seveml positive features.  It required the government to deal
with "strategic"  enterprises  in a more transparent fashion, placing greater  reliance on
allocation of subsidies through the budget rather than through the treasury-owned commercial
banks.  It also created incentives for borrowers  to make operational changes in order to
survive.  With new credit cut off,  working capital could only be generated by reducing costs,
collecting past due receivables,  or selling assets.  The EBRP also required  banks to set up
workout departments and take actions to resolve those loans that had been classified
nonperforming at year-end  1991.  This again strengthened the banks'  hand in negotiations
with problem borrowers.  In addition,  the Treasury-owned commercial banks were required
to undergo repeated portfolio evaluations by outside auditors.  This forced the creation of
management information systems and provided the government with a mechanism for
verifying banks'  compliance with restrictions on lending to problem borrowers.
to date it does not appear to have imposed strong market-based incentives on banks.
'  The foreign trade bank,  OTP,  was privatized  in January  1995.  Budapest Bank has not yet succeeded in
finalizing a privatization deal.  It should be noted that the new government that took office in mid-1994 appears to
be intent on moving forward with positive reforms in these areas.  It is now undertaking in-depth audits of the banks
and is working on a program of bank privatization.16
These direct mandates were accompanied  by other less direct changes in incentives.
In 1992 bank employees  were given the right to purchase up to 20 percent of their banks'
shares upon privatization  at half-price. This strengthened  the incentives  of competent
managers  at solvent banks to adopt prudent policies, with respect both to the workout of the
existing loan portfolio and to the creation of new loans.  Furthermore, the recapitalization
was accompanied  by a clear plan for privatization  of the nine treasury-owned  commercial
banks.  So far three commercial  banks have been privatized. 2"
Discussions  of the bank recapitalization  plan began in 1992, were put into law in
February 1993, and were implemented  in September 1993. From the outset of discussions,
the government sought  to determine the amount of capital  to be injected  based on the value
of loans that were nonperforming  at year-end 1991. This was designed to avoid penalizing
those banks that had already taken aggressive action to deal with their problems  and to
maintain incentives  for managers to oversee other loans in the bank's portfolio.
While Poland's banking policy made greater efforts to deal with incentive  problems
than did Hungary's, it has been far from perfect.  First, large segments  of the financial
system initially  escaped coverage, including  the problem-plagued  agricultural bank, housing
bank, cooperative  banks, and private banking sector.  Second, Poland's program assumes
that bank management  is competent  and will respond to incentives. There are no explicit
criteria governing the dismissal  of management  for poor performance, and there has been
little turnover in bank senior management. Third, while bank policies focus extensively  on
how to work out bad debts, there are few directives  aimed at correcting deficient  lending
procedures.  This leaves open the possibility that a bank can create a large quantity of new
bad loans before some sort of preventive action is taken.  These shortcomings  are of more
than academic interest, as at least two treasury-owned  commercial  banks have continued to
deteriorate in 1994.
Banking Performance
Are these differences  in policy affecting the way banks behave in general, and how
they deal with nonperforming  borrowers in particular? While the jury is still out, available
data and anecdotal evidence suggest that they could be.  Tables 2 and 3 show basic data on
the banks that have been the primary focus of reform efforts in the two countries. 28 The
differences in the overall capital position of banks in the two countries is striking.  Risk-
'  Bank Wielkopolski  in Wroclaw was privatized  in 1993.  Bank  Slaski in Katowice  was privatized  in early
1994. BPH in Krakow  was privatized  in January 1995. To encourage  privatization  of the commercial  banks, donor
countries contributed  $500 million  to the Polish  Bank Privatization  Fund.  As banks are privatized,  the funds are
released  to the Polish government  to cover interest payments  on the recapitalization  bonds.  Only banks  privatized
before March 1996  qualify.
I  In both cases these banks account for approximately  30 percent of total banking system assets in their
respective  countries. However, it should be noted that the agricultural  loan portfolio, often a source of problem
loans, is included in the Hungarian  sample but excluded  in the Polish  sample.TABLE 2
Financial  Data for Seve  Sabtewned Commerciad  Banks
Year  1991  132  1993
billions of  % of  totl  bifiomof  % oftial  billios  of  %of  tal
zlotys  *ssets  zlotys  Ss  zitys  s
Total assets  80,620  119,699  170,874
Credit to nongovt  44,434  0.56  52,846  0.44  60,934  0.35
Bad Loans-  14.038  0.19  17,906  0.16  19,382  0.12
Equity and other capital  3,452  0.043  4,040  0.034  15,086  0.088
--manus  recapitalization  3,452  0.043  4,040  0.034  3,798  0.022
Risk idj.  Capital Ratio°  0.027  0.039  0.236
Profits after tax  690  .0085  2621  .0218  7915  .0463
Real values (1991=1.00)
Total assets  1.00  1.09  1.18
Loans  to nongovt.sector  1.00  0.87  0.76
Exciides Central  Investrnent  Loans  (which are government-guaranteed)
For six banks  only (data  on seventh  bank not available)
Deflated  using GDP deflatorTABLE 3
Financial Data for Six Hungarian  State-owned Banks
Year  1991  192  1993
billion  % of gross  billion  % of gross  billion  % of gross
forint  assets  forint  assets  forint  assets
Total  Gross  Assets  751  805  781
Credit  lo Nongovt  Sector  565  0.753  544  0.676  519  0.664
Loans  transferred  as  part  98
of  1992 LCS
Write  offs  and  provisions  21  0.028  60  0.074  158  0.202
Eqtuity (before  1993 recap.)  62  0.083  27  0.034  -62  -0.079
Profits  after  tax  -21  -0.026  -125  -0.160
Real  values (1991 = 1.00)'
Total  gross  assets  1.00  0.92  0.75
Credit  to nongovt.  sector  1.00  0.82  0.66
Credit  to nongovt.  sector  1.00  0.82  0.79
including  LCS
Deflated  using  GDP  deflator19
based capital ratios for Poland's  seven treasury-owned banks currently  range from a low of 9
percent to a high of 45 percent. 29 Excluding the 1993 capital injection, they range from a
low of -10 percent  to a high of 28 percent,  with three of the banks above the six percent
level.  Excluding the effects of the recapitalization, the equity of the treasury-owned
commercial banks as a group  remained steady between December  1991 and December  1993,
with five of the banks posting significant improvements.  In contrast,  prior to the  year-end
1993 recapitalization, equity levels at Hungary's  three largest banks were all negative, and
were strongly negative in at least two of the three. 3"  Even after the enormous  1993
recapitalization,  it has been estimated that equity remained negative for 5 of the 8 banks in
the program.3'
The stronger equity position of banks in Poland is unlikely to  result simply from
differences in GDP performance or in the competitive environment in the two countries.  The
shock to GDP was similar in both countries over the 1990-93 period.  Furthermore,  banks in
both Poland and Hungary have operated in less than fully competitive environments,  as
markets have been fragmented and new entry in banking-particularly  by foreign banks-has
been controlled (if not prohibited)  One potential indicator of competition is the spread
between interest  rates on demand and time deposits, treasury bills, and loans.  Interest
spreads in the two countries are shown in Table 4.  The data suggest somewhat more
competition on the deposit side and perhaps somewhat less competition on the lending side in
Poland than in Hungary.32 However,  although spreads are somewhat higher,  Poland's  rate
29  In comparison,  the range  among U.S.  banks is 10 to 18 percent.
Although no exact figures exist, given the absence of detailed audits, estimates of negative bank equity range
up to -25% for one of the largest state banks.
i"  Bonin  and  Schaffer  (1994).
32  Rates on demand deposits are  very low in both countries--currently  5 percent  in Poland and  3 percent  in
Hungary.  In Poland rates on  time deposits are  much higher and are above the rates on treasury  bills, arguably
indicating significant competition in raising  funds at the margin.  In Hungary,  on the other  hand, rates  on time
deposits are  almost  6  percentage  points  below  the  treasury  bill  rate,  and  over  6  percentage  points  below  the
interbank rate.  This suggests that the market for time deposits in Hungary is, if anything, less competitive than in
Poland.
It is more difficult to assess the degree of competition on the  lending side of the balance sheet.  As
of March  1994, spreads between lending rates and treasury bill rates in Poland were  much larger  than analogous
spreads in Hungary.  While this could point to a somewhat more competitive banking environment in Hungary,  it
could also point to hidden fees that increase effective lending rates, greater restrictions on access to lending at those
rates,  and/or  non-profit-maximizing  behavior  on  the  part of  Hungarian  banks.  The extremely  small spread  in
Hungary between the riskless rate (on treasury bills) and the rate on much riskier assets (smaller even than in the
United States) seems infeasible in a competitive market and is difficult to understand and interpret without further
information.  Indeed, data on minimum loan rates suggests that at least some short-term loans in Hungary are being
priced below rates on treasury bills and interbank placements of comparable maturity.  Moreover,  in Hungary the
spread between loan rates and these reference  rates has been highly variable,  sometimes reaching  extraordinarily
high levels, and at other times falling to unreasonably low levels.TABLE  4
INTEREST  RATES  IN POLAND  AND HUNGARY
POLAND  Minimum  Loan  Treasury  Bil  CD Rate
Rate  Rate
January  1992  45.5  43.5  42.7
January  1993  45.0  41.3  39.8
January  1994  40.6  34.9  32.9
May  1994  39.3  32  32.4
HUNGARY  Average  Minimum  Average  Interbank  CD Rate
Rate  on  Reported  Treasury  Rate
New  Rate on  Bill Rate  :  .......
Loans  New...
. ....  ...
_____  _____  L oan  s  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
January  1992  36.8  21  31.3  35.9  31.5
January  1993  29.8  19  15.1  17.0  17.3
January  1994  26.3  20  23.4  22.6  17.8
March  1994  26.7  20  23.5  23.9  17.621
structure may in fact better  reflect a market-based approach to risk pricing in this high-risk
environment.
Although differences in competitive environments may not be of major importance, it
is admittedly still difficult to make judgments on relative incentives and performance based
on aggregate capital ratios alone.  The differences could result from other factors that are not
directly comparable.  First,  they could result from differences  in initial positions.
Hyperinflation may have eroded away a greater portion of the inherited bad loan portfolio in
Poland, or the initial allocation of loans to these Polish banks may have been of higher
quality than in the Hungarian case.  Second. the differences could result from differences in
accounting and provisioning policies.  The timing of the rapid deterioration in capital in
Hungarian banks has been attributed to the adoption in  1991 of banking and bankruptcy laws
that forced a rapid provisioning of existing problem loans (i.e. a recognition of problems that
already existed) in  1992 and 1993.33 In contrast,  even as far back as mid-1990 the Polish
authorities commissioned  diagnostic bank audits based on international accounting standards
(even though regulatory  capital requirements continued to be calculated using Polish
accounting standards),  and it is these audited figures that are shown in Table 2.  Thus, the
Polish year-to-year figures are directly comparable to each other,  while the Hungarian figures
reflect changes in provisioning policies as well as the underlying quality of the loan portfolio.
All this being said, however, the differences in reported equity of Polish and
Hungarian banks cannot be ignored.  To the extent that the decline in Hungarian bank equity
from  1991 to  1993 reflected continued deterioration  in the quality of the loan portfolio rather
than merely a recognition of historical losses (due to changes in accounting practices),  the
differences suggest that Hungary's  commercial banks did not stabilize as quickly as Poland's.
Furthermore,  to the extent the timing of the decline reflected a desire and ability of
Hungarian banks to avoid recognizing losses when they initially occurred, this suggests weak
incentives 34 and lax supervision.  In particular, the banks may have had strong incentives to
avoid forcing borrowers  into bankruptcy or liquidation, since they would then be forced to
provision fully against the bad loans.  This may in part explain why one-half of Hungary's
largest loss-makers  in 1992 had still not entered bankruptcy or liquidation by early  1994.  As
a third explanation,  some have suggested that banks may have overstated their problems in
the hope of gaining a larger bailout. 35 While this could in part be true,  it is unlikely to
account for a large share of the capital deterioration.  Any of these explanations raises
questions about the efficacy of Hungarian policies on banking reform during that period.
The nontransparency  of the Hungarian situation, caused in large part by the absence of in-
33  Bonin and  Schaffer  ( 1994).
3  Some  Polish  bank  managers  may  also  have  desired  to  hide  their  losses.  but  repeated  external  audits  made
this  more  difficult.
3  Bonin  and  Shaeffer  (1994).22
die%pth  external audits of the banks,  makes it very difficult to draw firm conclusions and is
ilself arguably an indication of policy weakness.
TIhe  Legal  Framework  for  Debt  Collection
I'he third critical  requirement for creditor monitoring and control in a market
t-coinomy  is an appropriate  legal framework and effective procedures for debt collection.
WVithout  an effective system of debt collection,  debtors lose repayment discipline, the flow of
credit is constrained,  and creditors may be forced to turn to the state to cover losses if they
afe to survive.  Both Hungary and Poland are still in the early stages of developing market-
oriented debt-collection mechanisms,  although they have made some initial progress and are
arguably further down this path than other reforming socialist economies.  However,  there is
still a long way to go.  The basic reality is that it is still quite difficult for creditors to collect
unpaid debts in Hungary or Poland,  and until this is eased credit cannot be expected to flow
freely and efficiently.  In addition to problems in some of the laws themselves, the debt
collection system is subject to tremendous institutional deficiencies that are typical in
transition and will take time to resolve.  For example, the courts are understaffed and their
personnel underpaid.  Judges are often not familiar with bankruptcy principles.  Bailiffs are
not always well-trained or accountable,  and the receiver profession  is still in its infancy
(particularly in Poland).
For purposes of discussion,  the legal framework for debt collection can be divided
into three subparts:  collateral/secured  lending, the workout process,  and
bankruptcy/liquidation.
Collateral
In both Hungary  and Poland, the laws regarding collateral date essentially from the
pre-war period and fail to provide an adequate foundation for a strong financial system or an
efficient market economy.  The problems are many.  First,  the definition of property that can
be used as collateral is narrow,  particularly  in Poland.  Real property can be the subject of a
mortgage,  but liens on moveable property are in theory limited by the legal requirement that
timey  be possessory,  i.e.  that the property subject to the lien be physically  in the possession of
ihe lender.  In fact lenders appear to be able to circumvent this requirement in practice (for
example, by retaining title in the hands of the lender while transferring  physical possession to
the bortower),  but not without some risk.
Second, the registration of liens, needed to inform third parties and thus to establish
priority,  is inadequate.  Mortgages  on real property do not present a major legal problem in
this regard, as they can be registered in the land records.  The real problem with the
registration of liens involves moveable property (which are common albeit not wholly
envisioned in existing law,  as noted above).  There  is essentially no way to register liens on
movables in either country.  Thus it is very commoni to have several liens secured by the23
same property.  To increase their security in such a situation, banks take liens on far more
property than the value of the loan.  When everyone secures everything,  nothing is in fact
secured.
The third major problem  in both countries involves priorities  of liens.  Pursuant to the
Polish Code of Civil Procedure,  secured creditors come far down in priority,  below
procedural costs, payments to employees,  taxes, and rents due on government-owned
property.  Furthermore,  under other provisions of Polish law,  the government has an
automatic lien over all property of any party in arrears to the government (for taxes, social
security payments,  or customs duties).  This  lien need not be written or formalized in any
way to have priority.  Since most problem debtors have large arrears to the government,  this
automatic lien severely impinges on the security provided by any other liens.  Furthermore,
under current Polish law not the first but the last lien taken on a piece of moveable property
has priority,  if that lien was taken by the creditor in good faith (i.e. not knowing that other
liens existed).  This rule contrasts with the "first-in-time-first-in-right"  rule typical in market
economies.  Finally,  non-bank secured creditors are at an extreme disadvantage under current
Polish law, because all bank loans,  whether or not secured, have priority over other
creditors,  even if the latter are secured.
Although formerly quite reasonable,  Hungary's  priority  scheme has also recently
become problematic,  although it is still not quite so confused as that of Poland.  Under a new
law adopted in September 199436,  Hungarian secured creditors were demoted in priority to
come after liens to the government.  As the latter can be very high for problem firms,  this
change severely undercuts the value of collateral in Hungary.
Fourth,  the process of execution of liens is fraught with problems in both countries,
whether the lien arises from a collateral property right or simply from a court decision that a
debt is overdue.  Creditors must go to court (or arbitration) to get a decision that the loan is
indeed due, which gives them "executory title" to the debtor's  property.  This can take
months.  In Poland banks have the right to issue their own executory  title, 37 but they still
must go to court to have it stamped and thus "perfect" the title (which gives them the right to
order the bailiff to attach the property).  All creditors must pay the bailiff a large fee up
front-reportedly  10 percent of the loan amount in Poland-to  begin the actual collection
process.  Yet once the bailiff receives the money he seems to have little incentive to move
speedily, and thus creditors can literally wait years for anything to happen.  It is not
36 Law #53 on Debt Recovery Through  a Court Process.
3  Changes in Polish law allowing bank  lenders to avoid courts  in gaining executory  title (a prerequisite  to
foreclosure) have expedited the seizure of collateral.  The behavior of other creditors suggests that this procedural
shortcut  is valuable; privately owned Polish banks,  for example,  lobbied extensively to have this power,  initially
reserved  for state-owned banks,  extended  to them.  In  addition,  nonbank  creditors  now  hire banks  to conduct
foreclosures for them in order to obtain faster execution.24
surprising that bailiffs (which apparently constitute a powerful and tight-knit group) have a
negative image.
Finally, even if a creditor does succeed in gaining execution on a lien, the market for
many assets is thin, and thus it is often not easy to sell the collateral and thus collect on the
loan. 38 Even in the case of real property,  which one might expect would be easy to sell,
much of the property is encumbered by other liens (including tenants'  rights) that lower the
value and/or marketability of the property.  For residential property, for example, it is
virtually impossible to evict tenants and  sell mortgaged property unencumbered by tenants'
liens.
The difficulty in acquiring,  registering,  and foreclosing on collateral rights has meant
that certain kinds of lending are not profitable for lenders.  For instance, commercial bank
loans collateralized by residential real estate are relatively  rare because the current  legal
system makes foreclosure difficult and costly.  Working capital loans and longer termn  lending
for investment are both hindered by the overlapping claims and unclear rights and priorities
attached to moveable collateral.
Given these many problems,  how easy is it to reform collateral laws and procedures
to make collateral finance feasible and attractive in transforming economies?  Poland is the
first test case, as it has moved faster than any other transforming economy in an attempt to
strengthen its collateral system.  A modem collateral law has been drafted and debated over
the past three years,  and a close-to-final draft is ready for consideration by Parliament.  This
draft reformns  the priority rules to eliminate the automatic priority given to govermnent
claims,  to put  secured creditors at the top (albeit after costs of collection), and to remove the
preference currently  given to banks above other creditors (regardless of who is secured).  It
also provides for a central registry for all liens on moveable property,  and specifies that the
first lien to be registered has first priority.  Finally,  it simplifies somewhat the execution
procedure.  The draft law is expected to be adopted in  1995.
Debt workouts
A second critical component of the legal framework for debt collection is the
procedure for workouts and formal reorganizations. 39 These are means through which a
i  Shleifer and Vishny (1992) point out the importance of liquid asset markets and high liquidation values in
making collateral effective as a liquidation threat and hence making collateral-based finance attractive.
3'  The mnajor  difference between a workout and a formal reorganization is the identity of the parties bound by
the resulting agreement.  A workout is essentially a renegotiation of one or more debt contracts, carried out pursuant
to contract  law.  It binds only the parties to the relevant contracts.  If a firm has only a few important creditors,
workouts can be attempted quite easily  by negotiating solely with those creditors (and ignoring or  buying out the
claims of other smaller creditors).  However,  if a firm has many large and  important creditors,  or if much of  its
debt is in the form of bonds owned by the public at large, the transaction costs of dealing with each one individually
can be prohibitive (Gilson,  1990).25
problem debtor tries to negotiate  a reduction in immediate  debt service requirements  as a
means to keep the firm alive.  In return for the reduction in debt service, creditors may insist
upon partial payments or upon fundamental  changes in the size or functioning  of the firm in
order to increase their chances of future repayment  of the remaining  debt.  From a public
policy perspective,  these procedures  are intended  to promote reorganization  of firms whose
going concern value (post-reorganization)  exceeds their liquidation  value.  Such fimns, for
example, may have assets (such as specialized  machinery  or unique trademarks)  with little
value in alternative settings.
Both Poland and Hungary have taken far-reaching  steps since 1991  to adopt market-
based workout processes.  Poland has two existing  procedures for debt workout-one a
judicial procedure and the other an extrajudicial  one.  Judicial debt workouts  occur under the
law on 'Arrangement Proceedings", which provides a means for restructuring  a firm's debts,
thereby allowing it to continue in operation. This law dates from 1934 (although  significant
amendments  were made in 1990), and its main disadvantage  is its extreme inflexibility.40  In
order to overcome the deficiencies  inherent  in the Arrangement Proceedings  law, Poland
adopted a new procedure in February 1993 for working out bad loans-the  bank conciliation
agreement.4 1 This new procedure shifts power from the courts and the borrower to the
banks.  Banks are empowered  to negotiate  a workout agreement on behalf of all creditors,
providing  they receive approval  of creditors representing  over 50 percent of the value of
outstanding  debt.  The conciliation  process is being used quite extensively  (Table 5), even by
banks that were not required to do so under the EBRP.  Moreover, the seven Treasury-
owned commercial  banks are inifiating  conciliation  negotiations  with borrowers even in cases
when the law does not require action.
Borrowers and/or certain creditors acquire several potential  advantages  if they opt for
resructuring under bank-led  conciliation  rather than judicial conciliation. First, the process
is likely to be somewhat  quicker and less cumbersome,  because the courts are not involved
except to hear an appeal against an agreement. Second, priority rules change.  The state
Tmasury loses its superpriority. Only the social security office and secured  creditors retain
priority.  Third, the ability of a minority  of creditors to block agreements is limited.  Fourth,
responsibility  for monitoring  the restructuring  program is explicitly  delegated  to the lead
<'  For example, wordouts  under this law exclude  secured creditors  and government  creditors  (such as tax and
social security offices), and thus in most cases the proceeding  covers only trade creditors  (since banks typicaily
secure dthir loo).  Fuilherd ore, all relevant  creditors  must be trated  identicaly under the law. The concessions
given to different  creditors  cannot thus be tailored  to their specific  needs.  In addition,  the procedure  provides  only
for finacial  terms in the resulting  agreement. Broader restnucturg  provisions,  such as changes in employment,
investment,  or mnagement, are not envisioned. Fnally, only parties attending  the proceedings  are allowed  to vote
on the proposed agreement.  It may be very difficult for a debtor with many creditors to assemble the required
majority in one plce  for the vote.
41  For an in depth description,  sew  Kawalec,  Sikora,  and RynasIasd  (1994) and van Wijnbergen  (1993).
For a preliminay analysis of results, see Kawalec, et. al. (1994), Beaks  (1994), and (in Polish) Chmielewkic  et.
al. (1994).TABLE 5
Outcome of the Poland's  Enterprise and Bank Restructuring  Program:
The Status (as of April 30,  1994) of Nonperforming Borrowers That Owed Money
to 7 Polish Treasury Owned Commercial Banks on December  1991
Status as of April 30,  1994:
Percent of  Number
1991 balances  of firms
Signed conciliation agreement  50%  202
--of which partially  serviced debt  25%  98
Resumed scheduled debt service'  19%  102
Repaid debt  13%  211
Entered bankruptcy  10%  121
Debt sold or posted for  sale  5 %  89
Entered Article  19 liquidation  3%  50
'  Paid  past  due interest  and  scheduled  repayments  of principal. This category  includes  nominally  short
term  loans  that  are rolled  over.27
bank.  If the lead bank does not terminate  the agreement when the restructuring  plan is
violated, it becomes liable for any additional losses incurred by the other creditors.  Fifth,
the range of potential outcomes is broader under conciliation.  For example, banks may
exchange debt for equity.  Finally,  if the conciliation agreement is declared void, any
concessions by the Treasury or the social security agency are unwound.  This gives the
borrower  and the lead bank strong incentives to develop a reasonable plan.
Hungary is significantly ahead of Poland in developing its judicial  workout system,
although in practice creditors may still derive relatively little benefit from the law and
procedure  (due primarily to information and incentive problems discussed above).  In 1991
the Hungarian Parliament adopted a tough new bankruptcy/liquidation law that took effect on
January  1, 1992.  It required managers of firms with any arrears of 90 days or more to file
for reorganization (called "bankruptcy"  in the Hungarian case) or liquidation.  On its face,
the 1991 law looks very  similar to the reorganization provisions of bankruptcy laws in
advanced market economies,  particularly  Chapter  11 of the U.S.  Bankruptcy Code.
Managers of bankrupt firms retain their jobs after filing, and have the first opportunity to
present a reorganization plan.  Creditors then vote on the plan, and have the opportunity to
present altemative plans.  If an agreement  cannot be reached the procedure  reverts to
liquidation.  From the first filing until the final agreement is reached, the courts have
relatively little involvement; the main actors are the parties themselves and the trustee
(selected by the creditors from a list of licensed trustees/liquidators).  The law was amended
(effective September  1993) to remove the automatic trigger and change several other
significant features of the law. 42
The 1991 law led to a wave of filings for both reorganization and liquidation (see
Table 6).  Over 22,000 cases were filed in the two-year period from January  1992 through
1993, including over 5,000 bankruptcy cases and over 17,000 liquidation cases.  Resolution
of the bankruptcy cases has typically been quite speedy, with more than 90% completed
during that period.  Liquidation cases take much longer, and most cases filed during  1992-93
are still pending.
In addition to the judicial bankruptcy process, the Hungarians adopted a nonjudicial
workout procedure  (the "loan consolidation"  process) concurrent  with the year end-1993
recapitalization in an attempt to force banks to resolve problem loans expeditiously.  The
number of reorganization filings under the bankruptcy law declined dramatically in 1994, in
42  Among  other things, the 1993 amendments  (1) removed  the requirement  that a debtor file for bankruptcy
if 90 days in arrears, making  it instead  optional; (2) reduced  the required  majority  for approval  of a reorganization
agreement  from 100%  to: a. two-thirds  (in value) and  b. one-half  (in number) of mature claims  plus one-fourth
(in number)  of not-yet-mature  claims; (3) allowed  the debtor a 90-day  moratorium  on debt service  payments  (which
was previously automatic)  only if the same majority agrees; (4) raised compensation  levels for liquidators;  (5)
required  the appointment  of a trustee in bankruptcy  (which  was optional  before); and (6) allowed  debtors to resort
to bankruptcy  every 2 years (measured  from filing date) rather than only every 3 years (measured  from the date of
agreement)  as it was under the 1991 law.TABLE 6:  Hungarian Bankruptcy -and Liquidation Processes
1-92 through  12-93
Bankrutc  Liquidation
FILINGS  5,156  17,133
Of these:
SOEs  429  1,820
Cooperatives  965  2,768
Business Entities  3,762  12,545
(of these,  limited
liability companies)  (2,959)  (8,927)
Of these, approximate  %
with over  300 employees  6%  *
51-300 employees  24%  *
50 or fewer  70%  *
STATUS AS OF  12-31-93
Closed  4,627  (90%)  **
- With  Ageement  1,250  (27%)
- Reversion to  liquidation  1,377  (30%)
- Administration  completion  2,000  (43%)
Pending  529 (10%)
Source: Ministry of Finance data
*  Data  not available
**  Over  10,000 liquidation cases  were completed  by the courts  in 1992 and  1993, but these
included cases filed in earlier years under the previous  law.  Furthermore,  over three-fourths
of those  completed cases were "administrative  completions",  i.e. cases withdrawn  or rejected
on administrative grounds rather than completed on the merits.  Only a very  small number of
the  17,133 cases filed since January  1, 1992 have been completed to date.  The law officially
gives liquidators two years to finish a liquidation,  and that deadline is only now being reached
in a significant number of cases.29
part due to the changes in the law and possibly in part also due to the adoption of this
process.  While in theory something like the Polish scheme,  in fact the "loan consolidation"
process  is very different.  The process  is more akin to a general  workout under contract law,
in that any agreement  binds only those parties that negotiate it-primarily  the major banks,
with government  creditors agreeing to go along on a pro rata basis.  In the first round, the
so-called "simplified process",  involving 55 firms picked by the government (on unclear,
seemingly political grounds),  representatives of line ministries were invited to participate in
the negotiations, and the State Property Agency was given the right to purchase the bad debts
of firms from  banks if no agreement could be reached in the particular case.  Although
SPA's  resources  to buy debt were limited in the first round,  the buy back option and the line
ministry involvement gave an impression of softness to the process that appears to have
reinforced some of the negative incentives discussed earlier and thereby undermined the
discipline of both the banks and the enterprises to reach agreement and take difficult steps
toward enterprise  restructuring.  Unlike the Polish conciliation process, the recently added
Hungarian nonjudicial procedure does not appear to have strengthened the capacity of debt to
serve as a control instrument.  To the extent it undermined the developing bankruptcy
process,  it may even have been a setback.
Liidation
In addition to being an important means for closing ailing firms,  liquidation is the
final chain in the debt collection process.  Creditors'  control rights over firms in financial
distress derive  ultimately from their power to force the closure of the finn.  Yet in many
transition  economies the laws governing liquidation give little power to creditors (particularly
non-governmental  ones).
In Poland,  the liquidation of financially distressed  firms may occur under the
Bankruptcy Law  ("upadlosc")  or under Article  19 of the Law on State Enterprises (see
Tables 7 and 8).4  The Bankruptcy Law is modeled on prewar  European statutes, and
provides only  for liquidation."  Creditors or the debtor may file for bankruptcy, a
liquidator is appointed,  and the law provides  standard rules for winding up the estate and
satisfying claims in order  of priority (as discussed earlier).  The law as now designed has
several major deficiencies.  First and perhaps  foremost, the priority list discourages any
active involvement by non-government creditors in the bankruptcy process, because it makes
I  Liquidation  privatization,  under Article  37 of the Privatization  Law, is limited to firms that are healthy as
is not considered  here.
4  However, it is possible  for the firm to continue  operating  under the supervision  of the liquidator  while in
liquidation.Table 7
Judicial Bankruptcy and Conciiiation Procedures
in Poland:  1990 - 1992
1990  1991  1992  TOTAL
State-owned Enterprises  8  62  212  282
Communal Enterprises  0  0  23  23
Cooperatives  68  100  152  320
Private Enterprises  87  386  552  1025
Other  0  8  1  9
Total  163  556  940  1659
Source:  Polish Central  Planning Office (CUP).  This office did not collect data on bankruptcies
after 1992.
Table 8
"Exit" Process for Polish
State-owned Enterprises
(Cumulative through 03-31-94)
Bankruptcies (pending or completed)  602
Liquidations (Article  19, State-owned
enterprise Law)  1,125
Of these:
Completed  203
Converted to bankruptcy  258
Taken over by Rural Property Agency  51
Pending  613
Source:  Ministry of Ownership Transformation.31
it virtually impossible  for banks and other creditors to recover anything. 45 Creditors often
express the view that "the government  always comes first."  In fact, if the government  and
procedural  costs do not consume the entire estate, it is likely that employees' claims will.  A
second deficiency  is that the law provides few means for a receiver or judge-commissioner  to
void fraudulent  transactions made by managers  or owners, at the expense of creditors, prior
to the bankruptcy  filing. 46 Fraudulent transactions  are indeed thought to be common, and
the legal system must find a way to identify  and punish them if the bankruptcy  process (or
indeed any debt collection  process) is to be credible.
Article 19 is a legacy of the socialist legal system. Under Article 19, creditors may
initiate the liquidation  of a state-owned  borrower by petitioning  the governmental  entity
charged with exercising  ownership control.  Liquidation  is managed by a trustee charged
with seUing  off the assets in whole or part.  Only companies  that are still solvent  are eligible
for this procedure. However, interviews suggest that many of the companies in liquidation
prove to be insolvent  and ultimately  end up in the bankruptcy  courts.  Lenders may be
choosing the Article 19 liquidation  because the costs of realizing  collateral are lower and
because it affords an opportunity  to neutralize the superpriority  of state claims.
Liquidation  procedures in Hungary are contained  in the same law as the
reorganization  (or "bankruptcy")  process discussed  earlier.  As in Poland, the process is a
fairly standard one, at least on paper.  Creditors  or the debtor can petition for liquidation,  a
liquidator is appointed,  a list of assets is drawn up, and the assets are then supposedly  sold to
satisfy claims in the order of priority.  While the Hungarian  law does not have the same
confused and counterproductive  priority rules found in the Polish case (although  of all
collateral interests only mortgages on real property appear to have priority over unsecured
claims), the incentives  in the process (particularly  the compensation  formula for liquidators)
appear to lead many liquidators  to keep firms in operation for as long as possible, and to act
more as restructurers and privatizers than as agents of creditors. 4"  Furthermore, the
Hungarian process is thought  to be compromised  by fraud, both on the part of managers
45  Although  secured  creditors  can be satisfied  first (as in Western  bankruptcy  law), the priorities  among  secured
creditors  themselves  are subject to the same priorities  outlined  in the earlier discussion  on collateral,  which  means
that collection  fees, taxes and social security arrears automatically  precede bank creditors, which in turn precede
all nonbank  creditors. Once claims secured  by collateral  are satisfied,  the remainder  of the assets (and any excess
of proceeds  from the sale of secured  property over the value  of secured  claims) become  the bankruptcy  estate. This
estate  is then used to satisfy  creditor claims  in the priority  specified  in the bankruptcy  law itself.  According  to this
latter bankruptcy-specific  priority, bank and trade creditors  come behind (1) the costs of the proceedings  (which
include  all amounts  due to the court, the receiver, and employees  for wages, severance  payments,  etc.), (2) taxes,
and (3) social  security contributions.
4  The law provides  only that gifts made within 6 months  prior to filing can be voided.  It does not extend to
sales or other types of contracts (even if they contain an element of gift through underpricing).  There is a
possibility  under the Civil Code to void fraudulent  transactions  made  prior to filing, but such a process is extremely
difficult to implement  because  it requires proof of intent to defraud.
I  Gray, Schlorke,  and Szanyi, forthcoming  (1995).32
(who may remove vahuable assets before filing for liquidation) and on the part of liquidators
(who can find many wavs to profit from their near monopoly control over the process).  In
Hungary,  the problem is not so much the legal framework as it exists on paper as it is the
difficulty of administering it properly in an atmosphere  with poor information,  little
accountability, and confused incentives.
Is Debt Emer2ing as a Control Device?
The three areas discussed above-information,  creditor incentives, and the legal
framework for debt collection-are  all important in determining the power of creditors to
monitor and exert control over managerial decisionmaking.  Poland and Hungary have faced
similar challenges in all three areas.  In the legal area,  both have made significant progress
in developing workout processes, but they have further to go in streamlining liquidation
processes and developing workable systems of collateral.  Both liquidation and collateral law
appear to be somewhat less developed in Poland than in Hungary,  although in the latter area
Poland may soon take a big step forward with the passage of a new collateral law.  In the
area of creditor  incentives, Poland's  policies to date appear to  have imposed stronger market-
oriented incentives on its commercial banks.  Polish treasury-owned commercial banks as a
group have stabilized their overall performance,  strengthened their capacity to exert pressure
on nonperforming  borrowers,  and improved their ability to allocate new credit.  While data
for Hungary is far less complete, the numerical and anecdotal evidence that does exist
indicates a less promising picture,  in large part due to the moral hazard caused by successive
recapitalizations and the absence of mitigating policies to strengthen bank incentives.  In both
countries banks have been protected not only by segmented markets and entry restrictions,
but also (at least in Hungary) by the position of the banks as "monopsonist" buyers of the
treasury bills issued to finance government budget deficits.
In sum,  it appears that debt is slowly emerging  as a control device, although further
development and strengthening of information, incentives and legal frameworks are needed if
it is to play the important monitoring role (alongside equity) outlined in the first  section of
the paper.  Some empirical  support for its slow but steady emergence is presented  below.
Dealing with Nonperforming Borrowers
Data from both countries indicate that banks are sensitive to nonperformance by their
borrowers.  Since early  1993 the seven Polish treasury-owned commercial banks have made
no new loans to nonperforming firms. 48 Furthermore,  thirteen percent of the loans of those
banks that were classified as nonperforming on December 31,  1991 have been repaid in full,
another  19 percent  have become current  on principal and interest, and another 25 or so
percent  have been partially serviced (Table 5).  Thus,  borrowers accounting for a total of 57
4  Internal  World Bank data.33
percent of loans that were classified  as nonperfonrming  on December  31, 1991  have since
made partial or full payments  to the banks.  Although  data for Hungary is less complete,
some  evidence suggests that Hungarian  banks, while perhaps continuing  to roll over bad
debts and capitalize  unpaid interest for some nonperforming  borrowers, are not offering new
money  to problem firmns  on a large scale. 49
Restructuring  Unprofitable  Firms
There are also signs that Polish banks are growing in their ability to take an active
role in workout situations, and that the restructuring  process is being governed,  at least in
part, by rational economic  considerations. In general, Polish banks seem to have approached
the conciliation  process in a strategic fashion. For example, banks sometimes  chose to
purchase  additional debt in order to qualify for bank-led  conciliation. In other cases, where
bank loans were secured with valuable  collateral, banks waited until unsecured  creditors
wrote-down  their debt under a court-led arrangement  proceeding  and then initiated  bank-led
conciliation  oI a contract renegotiation  under the civil code.  A number of banks indicated
that when they distrusted  management,  they sought a debt for equity swap so that they would
have the option of replacing  managers  (although  this was by no means the only motivation
for debt for equity swaps).
Furthermore, initial results indicate a clear correlation between the outcome  of the
process and the economic  prospects  of the debtor firm.  Data indicate that two-thirds  of the
firms that have successfully  reached conciliation  agreements  with banks to date have positive
operating  profits (before interest payments). Another 21 percent are close to the breakeven
point and are likely to post operating  profits as the Polish economy  strengthens. In contrast,
the less profitable of the nonperforming  borrowers  are more likely to be liquidated." 0
Potential profitability  may be necessary  but does not appear to be sufficient  to convince the
bankers, however.  Workout directors in Polish banks appear to look for a borrower's
demonstrated  ability to make at least  partial payments  on its debt before agreeing  to a
restructuring  plan.  Indeed, fifty percent of the borrowers signing conciliation  agreements
appear to have made some payments  since December  31, 1991. 1
In Hungary, there also appears to be a significant  push of unprofitable  firms into
restructuring. Of the 603 largest loss-making  firms in the country, almost one-half have
been the subject of a bankruptcy  or liquidation  filing.  (Why the other fimns  in that group are
49  Bonin and Schaffer (1994).
f  In a sample of all problem debtors of two of the seven treasury-owned Polish commercial banks, all of the
firms being liquidated through  bankruptcy procedures registered negative operating profits in  1992.  Firms being
liquidated under Article 19 of the Law on State Enterprises appear to be somewhat more profitable than firms being
liquidated under the bankruptcy law.  In at least a few instances, firms being liquidated under Article 19 improved
their operations enough  to convince their banks to enter into conciliation agreements.
1'  Internal World Bank data.34
not yet subjects of similar filings is an interesting unrzsolved question.)  Initia! results from
ongoing World Bank research on Hungarian bankruptcy 5 2 give mixed results as to the effect
of the process on enterprise restructuring.  On the one hand,  financial restructuring appears
quite limited in many cases.  For example, in the sample of 63 finalized bankruptcy
agreements studied, the majority envision only short extensions in the maturity of outstanding
debt, often combined with some write-off of debt principal and/or partial repayment of
principal or accrued interest.  Only 6 of the 63 cases provide for debt for equity swaps, and
only three have any provisions for new financing (two from bank creditors and one from
suppliers).  On the other hand, many of the plans do appear to envision some rationalization
of the operations of the debtor firm or at least to have been accompanied by such
rationalization.  A full 37 of the 63 agreements included some reduction in employment in
the debtor firm, and  19 included provisions for either asset sales or sales of part of the firm
as a going concern.  However,  only 4 provided explicitly for a change in top management of
the debtor firm, and only 2 for a change in board membership.  Along with these substantive
results,  it is interesting to note that the survey found that managers and/or owners were
always active and were often the de facto  controlling party in the cases, while banks were
sometimes active, sometimes passive, but never in control.  These preliminary findings
suggest that creditors were quite weak in  1992-93 and that the process may indeed have been
used in some cases by managers for their own ends-for  example,  as a means of
"spontaneous privatization",  as noted below.
Liquidating Unviable Firms
Although workouts are becoming quite common, creditors  in both countries are still
quite passive when it comes to initiating and overseeing the liquidation of nonperforming
borrowers.  In Hungary,  banks have initiated only a handful of the many liquidations cases
filed since 1992 (Table 9), and they are reported to behave quite passively in many of the
cases that are filed by others.  In Poland, banks typically allow other creditors to initiate
judicial liquidation proceedings.  Once proceedings are initiated,  banks typically spend little
time overseeing the liquidation.  This passivity is in part explained by incentives problems
(as discussed above), particularly in Hungary.  However,  it may also have some economic
logic given the low returns that banks can expect to receive from  liquidations under present
legal frameworks.  In Poland the low returns are a consequence of high court fees and the
near impossibility of banks'  recovering anything given the priority  rules described earlier.  In
Hungary,  creditors also appear to doubt their ability to recover any funds under liquidation,
not only because of priority problems but also because of opportunities both managers and
liquidators have to divert assets and sales receipts.  This lack of control may mean that firms
are not liquidated until everything of value has been transferred  from the firm.  Interviews
suggest that this is clearly an issue with small privately-owned firms in both Hungary and
Poland.  Whether this is the case with larger firms remains an open question.
Gray,  Schlorke, and  Szanyi, forthcoming (1995).TABLE 9:  Who Files Liquidation Cases in Hungary?
1992  - 1993
Percentage of Petitions
filed by:
Bank Creditors  1.5%
Government Creditors
(Tax, Social Security, Customs)  13%
Other Trade Creditors, Liquidators.
Conversions from Bankruptcy  67.5 %
The Firm Itself  18%
TOTAL  100.0%36
Allocating New Credit
Evidence on aggregate lending may provide subtle evidence that market-oriented
incentives may be stronger for banks in Poland than in Hungary.  While commercial banks in
both countries have down-sized their loan portfolios and substituted government securities for
loans, Poland's  commercial banks have done both more aggressively that Hungary's  (Figure
2).  This is counter to what one might expect if incentives were the same in both countries;
given the much lower capital ratios and the slower growth of the economy in Hungary,  one
might expect Hungary's  contraction in lending to be the stronger of the two.
Of the new loans that were made during this period, there is evidence of improvement
in the allocation of new credit by certain Polish banks.  At least some of Poland's  treasury-
owned commercial banks have succeeded in implementing effective credit policies.  At 5 of
the 9 commercial banks created in  1989, default rates on loans not already in default in 1991
have been relatively reasonable (less than 20 percent).  Data from the other 4 indicate higher
default rates on post-1991 loans, and it is not clear  whether the credit allocation process  is
improving in those cases.
Table  10 presents data on the borrowing patterns of a sample of approximately 200
Polish firms,  classified according to the percentage growth in their bank credit.
Interestingly, the two extreme categories-firms  that repaid all bank debt and firms that
increased their debt by over  100 percent-were  dominated by profitable firms.  Of the firms
that did not fully repay their debt (probably in large part because they did not generate as
high a level of retained earnings), table  10 indicates that the allocation by Polish banks of
new credit in  1993 was positively correlated with the profitability of the borrower.Figure 2:  Change in Real Lending 1991-1993
Poland  Poland  Hungary  Hungary










CHANGES IN BANK CREDIT IN 1993  IN A SAMPLE OF 151 POLISH FIRMS
Fully  Decreased  No Change  Increased  Increased
CHANGE  IN INDEBTEDNESS  Repaid  Bank Debt  in Bank  Bank Debt  Bank Debt
Bank Debt  (by less  Debt  (by less  (by  more
than 100%)  than 100%)  than 100%)
Number of firms  17  49  12  50  23
Average  profit as a share of total  .8%  -10.8%  -6.6%  -4.7%  0.2%
assets
Average  bank debt as a share of  2.3%  12.5%  16.0%  10.4%  5.9%
total assets (1992)  l
Average  bank debt as a share of  0%  9.4%  15.4%  12.8%  19.2%
total assets (1993)
Total flow of credit to/from this  -3.4  -245  0  450  644
group (billion zlotys)
Source: World Bank  Survey39
Regression results using this data 53 i3  indicate that, controlling for profitability,  banks
preferred to lend to new private firrns (as opposed to either state-owned or privatized firms).
The only detailed lending data available for Hungary to date does not cover 1993 and is
therefore  not directly comparable to the Polish results reported above.  (Even in Poland,
1991 and 1992 data may well show different patterns than 1993 data.)  Statistics on changes
in bank credit in 1992 for a sample of 3273 Hungarian firms compiled by Bonin and Schaffer
(1994) indicate that the 5 percent of firms with the lowest profitability increased their total
indebtedness in  1992 significantly more than the total sample of firms,  although this was
primarily due to the capitalization of unpaid interest rather than to any extension of new
credit.  There is not yet any Hungarian data that indicates a strong correlation  between bank
lending and firm profitability as in the  1993 Polish figures.
Changing Ownership
Finally,  information, incentives, and legal frameworks appear to be interacting in both
countries to stimulate some degree of ownership change, albeit in different ways and perhaps
for different reasons.  In Poland the ownership change arises in part through the bank-led
conciliation process.  Seven treasury owned commercial banks interviewed by the authors
had negotiated 44 conciliation agreements that involved debt for equity swaps, and one of the
banks had completed additional debt for equity swaps outside of the conciliation process.
However, to date these banks are still state-owned, and thus this ownership change will not
3  Numerous regressions were  run on the  Polish survey data to test the influence of  various  factors on the
allocation of bank credit.  One of two dependant variables was used: the change in bank debt of the firm from end-
1992 to end- 1993 divided by the total assets of the firn  (chBD/TA), and the percentage change in bank debt of the
firm, end-92 to end-93 (%chBD).  Among the independent variables included in the various  regressions were the
firm's profitability, i.e. return on assets in 1993 (PR93/TA); the share of fixed in total assets in 1993 (FA/TA); the
ownership status of the firm (dummy variables NP for new private firm, PRI for privatized firm);  the ratio of bank
debt to total assets in 1992 (BD/TA92); and the overall size of the firm (TA93).  Firms that totally repaid their debt
in 1993 were omitted from the sample for purposes of the regressions,  in the belief that such repayment mnay  have
indicated a lack of demand for credit altogether (and the regressions were  intended to test the influence of various
factors on the supply of credit, assuming demand existed).  Although the wide scatter of the data and the generally
low  R-squares  of  the  regressions  indicate  that  many other  factors  also  influence pattems  of  bank  debt,  it  is
interesting to note that profitability, private ownership,  share of fixed assets, and level of  indebtedness in 1992 all
have  some  explanatory  power  (and all  have positive  signs).  Because  profitability and  private  ownership are
themselves correlated.  the explanatory  power of the former drops if the latter is included in the regression.  Two
of the resulting equations (t-statistics in parentheses) are:
chBD/TA  =  -0.016  +  .059 PR93/TA  +  .041  FA/TA  +  .159  BD/TA92 +  .00 TA
(1.88)  (0.89)  (2.39)  (.12)
chBD/TA  =  -0.029  +  .033 PR93/TA  +  .047 FA/TA  +  .045 NP  +  .036  PRI +  .106 BD/TA92  +  .00 TA
(1.00)  (1.02)  (2.14)  (1.58)  (1.51)  (.70)40
constitute true privatization until the banks themselves are privatizec  In contrast to Poland,
the most substantial changes in ownership in Hungary have arisen not from debt for equity
swaps (which to date appear to have been rare,  as noted above), but rather from the sizeable
reallocation of assets (i.e. asset privatization) that appears to be occurring as a result of the
many bankruptcy and liquidation cases now reaching fruition."
Prospects  for the Future
The foregoing analysis suggests that Poland has arguably been more successful to date
in developing an appropriate policy framework for transforming its state-owned banks into
effective financial intermediaries.  On the other hand, Hungary has arguably made somewhat
more progress in developing debt collection mechanisms that will address the economy's
longer-run needs.  However,  it should be stressed that the situation is not static.  The
progress achieved in Poland with bank incentives can be easily undercut if not reversed by a
failure to privatize the banks, to strengthen the legal framework for debt collection, or to
dislodge poorly performing managers. 55 Furthermore,  Hungary's  failures in the area of
incentives can be reversed with the adoption of a program of in-depth external portfolio
audits, clear and credible policies on privatization,  safeguards to limit lending to problem
borrowers,  and an end to "no-fault" recapitalizations.  This is no time for complacency in
either setting.  Greater competition and falling inflation are likely to remove an important
source of profits for both banking systems  - high spreads on demand deposits (and, in the
case of Hungary,  time deposits).  These spreads have helped banks compensate for their
lending mistakes.  As these spreads are reduced through competition, the ability to cross-
subsidize their  lending operations will disappear.  Thus,  banks in both countries must also
concentrate on improving their credit allocation skills.
BEYOND POLAND  AND HUNGARY:  OTHER  APPROACHES  TO REFORM
There has been widespread debate about the best approach to strengthening the role of
debt as a control device in transitional economies.  Although most observers agree on the
need to reform accounting and disclosure standards and take other steps to improve the flow
s  While such reallocation is a normal result of workout and liquidation processes in any country,  it may be
exacerbated in transforming economies because of  information  asymmetries and  insiders'  desires to expropriate
valuable assets  from firms at the expense of creditors  and/or owners.  For example,  managers  may deliberately
delay payments in order to "qualify" for bankruptcy or liquidation procedures, and then purchase assets sold through
liquidation at low prices.  Alternatively, managers  may transfer valuable assets to private firms and then send the
remaining "shell'  companies into liquidation.  In any case, extensive privatization of assets is likely to result.  For
further discussion,  see Gray (1994).
"  Unfortunately,  recent proposals to consolidate four of the state-owned commnercial  banks into a single entity
may only serve to entrench  some poorly performing  managers and slow the development of competitive forces.41
of information, there is intense debate in the other two areas of reforn  discussed in this
paper.  With regard to the legal framework,  for example, various approaches to reforms in
bankruptcy and debt collection have been put forward, 56 and countries have moved in many
different ways and at very different speeds in promoting strong debt collection procedures.5"
This discussion has to some extent mirrored the widespread dissatisfaction with bankruptcy
processes in the West, 58 and at the same time has reflected the political and economic
tensions associated with rapid change and restructuring in the transition setting.
Most of the controversy to date, however, has surrounded the question of how to
reform creditor  (particularly bank) incentives.  Although this paper has focused on the
differences between the Hungarian and Polish programs,  both countries have followed a
broadly similar approach.  This approach can be questioned on at least three fundamental
levels:  the desirability of relying on government-funded recapitalization to make insolvent
banks solvent; the desirability of attempting to make the successors of the old monobanks the
cornerstone of a new market-oriented financial system; and the desirability of relying on
banks in general to play a significant role in corporate  governance and the allocation of
financial flows.
Early in the transition process, both Poland and Hungary  implicitly committed to protect
depositors in state-owned banks by injecting new capital into those banks.  Alternatively,
insolvent banks could have been "recapitalized" by restructuring the banks'  liabilities instead,
i.e. by writing down deposits and/or by converting some of the deposits to equity (thereby
forcing depositors to  share in the loss).  In contrast to recapitalization through government
injection of new capital, this latter approach results in a shrinkage of the bank to the extent
losses on the asset side are reflected in writedowns on the liability side. 59
Two concerns typically push governments to inject new capital rather than restructure
liabilities: fear of a political backlash from depositors, and fear of a system-wide financial
cfisis."  Recent  research casts some doubt on the conventional wisdom that forcing
depositors to bear loss inevitably risks serious macroeconomic disruption.  A recent study
identified five cases where governments dealt with significant insolvency problems by
5  For examples of different approaches and views, see Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992), Mizsei (1993), Bonin
and Schaffer (1994), and Gray (1994).  Still others see the development of secondary debt markets and extensive
set-off rights as a way to avoid a reliance on formnal  debt collection procedures altogether.
5  The Czech Republic, for example, deliberately delayed the implementation of its bankruptcy regime, in stark
contrast to Hungary's  aggressive approach.
s  For example,  see Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992).
5  A combination of some writedown and some injection of new capital is another possibility.
Proponents frequently offer a third argument, the preservation  of informational capital.  However,  this can
also be accomplished by restructuring liabilities to bring them into line with decreased asset values.42
restructuring bank liabilities."'  TI no case did a signiFicant decline in economic activity
result.  Indeed, in several cases an economic turnaround began within a month of the
restructuring of liabilities.  Although the restructuring of liabilities may not have promoted
macroeconomic growth, these findings indicate that the deleterious effects of liability
restructuring were not severe enough to derail recovery.
On a more fundamental level, other observers have questioned whether reform of
existing banking institutions is an efficient use of resources,  given the huge weight of the
socialist legacy.  As an alternative they have suggested "creative destruction"-replacing
these banks with new banking institutions-with  the view that new banks would not carry the
burdens of the past and would thus be more likely to internalize the appropriate
incentives. 62 Proponents of this view argue that existing state banks should be quickly
downsized, their capital being brought to adequate levels by removing assets (or shrinking
them through hyperinflation as has already happened in Russia) rather than increasing capital.
This view assumes that the corporate  governance mechanisms of new private intermediaries
will be more effective in avoiding fraud and moral hazard than those of the post-socialist
successors of the monobanks.
If the newly chartered banks are clearly outside the safety net, this approach may well
be useful in creating new, effective financial intermediaries.  However,  one cannot readily
assume that new banks will initially behave better than old ones if the fundamental
underpinnings-information,  incentives, and legal frameworks-are  not changed.  In the early
stages of transition,  informnation  problems make it difficult to for depositors (or anyone else)
to identify private bank owners that are engaged in fraud.  For reasons that we do not yet
fully understand, countries that liberalize domestic chartering policies almost always fail to
follow up with reforms mandating adequate disclosure and creating a well-functioning
supervisory system.  Ex post legal sanctions are unlikely to be an effective deterrent, given
"  Baer  and Klingebiel  (1994). The cases  studied  are the United  States  (March 1933),  Japan (1946), Malaysia
(1986), Argentina  (1989).  and Estonia  (1992). Estonia's 1992  experience  with  liability  restructuring  is informative.
In December 1992 the govemment  closed one problem  bank and merged two others together.  Liabilities  were
written  down in all three cases, with depositors  in the closed bank incurring losses  and depositors  in the other two
banks incurring  a risk of future loss if problem  debts could not be recovered. This  program led to no systemic
financial  crisis.  Indeed, in early  1993 Estonia became  the first of the FSU economies to post an increase in
industrial  production,  and by the third quarter of 1993  growth in the industrial  sector was accompanied  by growth
in GDP.  It is also interesting  to note that the liability  restructuring,  rather than impeding  the growth of credit to
the  private sector, seems to have reversed a year long decline in real credit to the private sector.  The Estonian
experience  suggests  that the governments  of Eastern Europe  could perhaps  have restructured  their banking  systems
with  considerably  less  fiscal  burden  and considerably  fewer  incentive  problems  without  sacrificing  growth. (Political
pressures  of course play  a major  role in the choice  of strategy. It is interesting  to note that depositors  were fully
protected  in the more recent failure  of the second  largest Estonian  bank.)
62  Phelps,  et al. (1993), Pohl and  Claessens  (1994).43
shortfalls in institutional capacity and precedent in the legal system.  In this environment,
new banking licenses may initially be nothing more than a license to steal. 63
Of course,  neither Hungary nor Poland has fully opened their doors to unhindered
foreign investment in the banking sector.  Foreign banks can bring capital, skills, reputation,
and foreign supervisory practices-assets  that can improve the chances that creative
destruction,  or indeed more traditional banking reforms, can succeed.
Finally,  others have questioned the role of banks and credit more generally,  suggesting
that equity funds should be the primary mechanisms for channeling finance in transition
economies.  As discussed earlier,  however,  theory and evidence both reinforce the view that
equity and debt each have important, and to some extent complementary, roles to play in
monitoring and exerting control over enterprise  managers.  While debt need not, and
probably cannot, play the lead in corporate  governance and finance in these economies in the
near tern,  the experiences of the early reformers-Hungary,  Poland, and Estonia among
them-provide  clues as to what must be done to make debt a meaningful control device that
can contribute to the enormous task of enterprise  restructuring.
63  For an interesting  discussion  of these issues see Akerloff  and Romer  (1994). The track record of Poland's
domestically  owned private  banks, which  are in much  worse shape  than its state-owned  commercial  banks, does  not
give much comfort.44
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